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Christina J. Schneider and Branislav L. Slantchev
Abstract International cooperation can fail even though governments have no dis-
tributional conflicts or incentives to free-ride, face no informational or credibility prob-
lems, and even agree on the policies that need to be implemented. Germany’s refusal to
cooperate with the Eurogroup members on the Greek bailout in 2010 until the crisis
threatened to derail the entire Eurozone is puzzling in that regard especially because
Germany is the main beneficiary of the euro. It was alleged at the time that this was a
dilatory tactic designed to postpone a domestically unpopular decision until after
crucial regional elections. But why would voters allow themselves to be misled like
that? And why did Merkel agree to the bailout before the elections took place? To
analyze how citizen preferences affect international cooperation, we develop a game-
theoretic model of the four-way interaction between two governments that must coordi-
nate a response to a crisis affecting both countries but who also must face the polls
domestically with an electorate that might be uncertain whether a response is necessary.
We find that, paradoxically, governments that stand to receive the greatest benefits from
international cooperation face the greatest obstacles to implementing the required poli-
cies even when voters would want them to. We show how the model can rationalize
Merkel’s electoral strategy and why her party suffered at the polls when the strategy
went off the rails.
On 11 January 2010 the lie became official: Eurostat—the agency responsible for
statistical information in the European Union (EU)—published a report that ques-
tioned the figures about national debt and budget deficits that the Greeks had sup-
plied. The subsequent drastic austerity measures the Greek government
implemented provoked determined popular resistance and in less than two months
the country was engulfed in often violent protests against higher taxes and deep
cuts in the public sector. The leaders of the EU scrambled to stem the crisis in
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cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but they could agree on only
a relatively modest emergency loan. In late April the credit rating agencies down-
graded Greek government bonds to junk, and the financial panic began to infect
other Eurozone members. The crisis was threatening to turn into a catastrophe that
could unravel the entire Eurozone, and an increasingly vocal chorus of politicians,
leaders in the banking and financial industry, and economists pressed for an immedi-
ate (and very large) bailout package.
Stunningly, the lone holdout that fiddled while Rome burned was none other than
Germany—the country that was the primary beneficiary of a stable Eurozone and that
correspondingly stood to lose the most from its collapse. Because German banks had
invested heavily in the debt the Greek government was threatening to repudiate, the
German government’s foot dragging was indeed puzzling. By the time Germany
finally came around in early May, the crisis had deepened and spread: the overall
cost of the package had ballooned to more than twice the original estimate;
Germany’s share alone was nearly as high as the total original amount the EU had
been set to provide.
Why was international cooperation on the financial bailout so difficult to achieve
even in the usually cooperative context of the EU? Why was the main obstacle to this
cooperation the country that was (and still is) among the most keen on the Eurozone?
Our existing explanations of international cooperation cannot answer these questions.
As we document, the evidence is not consistent with theories that explain the failure
to cooperate as arising from incentives to free-ride in the provision of public goods,
the absence of institutions that provide information and enhance coordination or the
credibility of commitments, attempts to coerce others into granting more favorable
terms, or constraints imposed by more hawkish legislatures. An alternative explana-
tion, popular in the press and among politicians at the time, centers on Merkel’s fears
about crucial elections that could determine whether her coalition would keep its
federal dominance. It is unclear why voters would fail to see through a delaying
tactic, and how a domestic conflict over the desirability of a policy affects coopera-
tion at the international level. Somewhat astonishingly, we have no theories of how
this mechanism is supposed to work in such a context, even though cooperation fail-
ures regularly happen even without serious distributional conflict.
We develop a game-theoretic model of the four-way interaction between two gov-
ernments that must coordinate a response to a crisis affecting both countries but that
also must face the polls domestically with an electorate that might be uncertain about
what response is necessary. We analyze how the potential domestic conflict over a
particular policy’s desirability interacts with the desire to cooperate among the gov-
ernments under asymmetric information. We show that the data are consistent with
the equilibrium that can rationalize delay for electoral reasons, and that it was pre-
cisely because the Eurogroup governments were widely known to be quite supportive
of the Eurozone system that they could not have acted fast enough or aggressively
enough to contain the crisis and instead opted for policies that ended up endangering
the very system they benefited from. Paradoxically, had Germany been less enthusi-
astic about the euro, Merkel could not have employed dilatory tactics and would have
2 International Organization
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been able to persuade the skeptical German voters that a bailout was necessary by the
end of April. The model can account for the delay, the sudden change of course, and
the subsequent clobbering at the polls.
On the empirical side, we aim to adjudicate among rival explanations of the
German government’s puzzling behavior. We offer evidence that supports an inter-
pretation of the German strategy that is firmly rooted in domestic politics. Aside
from intellectual curiosity, there are important reasons to get the story right
because the policy implications one draws from this episode differ fundamentally
depending on one’s interpretation. If Merkel had simply made a mistake, then
there would be little to learn from this episode. If Merkel had played a traditional
war of attrition to obtain better terms from Greece and the Eurozone members,
then one could safely ignore domestic politics when it came to international
policy. But if she delayed because of elections, then we would need to pay closer
attention to the way domestic electoral issues shape international behavior.
On the theoretical side, we specify a mechanism that can explain a strategy of
delaying unpopular policies until after the elections without relying on irrational
voters or uncertainty over the postelection government policy. This mechanism
relies on the voters’ uncertainty about the appropriateness of the policy that has
already been put in place by the incumbent, and their attempts to make inferences
about it. We show how strategic information transmission can occur in a multilateral
setting where two governments with somewhat mixed motives for cooperation and
potential for collusion have to cope with their respective electoral concerns. We
also show that the presence of a second signaling actor can serve as a constraint,
and that even when distributional conflicts are minimized, informational problems
can translate into serious policy failures.
Our analysis has several broader implications for international relations theory more
generally. The emphasis on signaling instead of distributive politics shows how the
lack of transparency in international negotiations can create a “democratic deficit”
that results in international cooperation that citizens don’t want. However, it also
reveals that the presence of a competitive domestic electorate can enable governments
to implement policies that the citizens want under circumstances when that would
have been impossible had they been unconstrained. In particular, preference hetero-
geneity among the governments makes credible signaling possible, which allows them
to cooperate without suffering a domestic backlash that would otherwise have occurred.
While there are clear limits to what voters can achieve with an instrument as blunt as
removal from office, there are nevertheless occasions where the threat to do so can be
consequential. Whether for good or bad depends on what the citizens already believe,
which in turn constrains how much the government can shift their beliefs.
Domestic Politics and International Cooperation
How are we to understand situations where international cooperation clearly failed, at
least for a while? If the issue is a public good, then our theories say that cooperation
The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation 3
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might fail because of incentives to free ride, high transaction costs, or inability to
coordinate effectively or to commit credibly. If the issue occasions distributional con-
flict, then cooperation might fail because veto-wielding domestic constituencies
could be unhappy with the deal their government has worked out.1
Germany’s failure to cooperate in the bailout until it was almost too late presents a
puzzle to these theories. The Eurozone members worked in the dense institutional
environment of the EU, had ongoing frequent interactions that involved multiple
issues, faced low transaction costs, and shared information almost compulsively.
As we detail in our study, whatever limited use of coercive tactics was made
ended well before the crisis escalated, and there was no evidence of attempts to
free ride on the efforts of others. Contributions to the bailout, like most other financial
matters in the EU, were tied to the size of the economy of individual members, and
there was little room to negotiate deviations from existing European Central
Bank (ECB) formulas. There were certainly disagreements among the creditors—
participation of the IMF, austerity measures in Greece, and loans on nonconcession-
ary terms—but these were resolved in principle as early as March and in practice by
mid April, yet Germany still refused to cooperate for several crucial weeks. Despite
parliamentary debates in the two largest contributors, Germany and France, the
legislatures were not a constraint (in fact, the opposition in Germany was pushing
the government to introduce the appropriate legislation).
One could focus on the citizens rather than legislators and on elections rather than
ratification as the relevant constraint or motivator for governments. For example, a
government could persist with a policy it knows to be bad out of fear that trying to
alter it would reveal its incompetence and result in electoral defeat.2 But since this
argumentation considers only the domestic aspects of foreign policy, the analysis
has no foreign government whose behavior must be taken into account: no problems
of international cooperation emerge and no complications arise from that government
having to be responsive to its own citizens.3 What is needed is a mechanism that
could connect international cooperation with electoral incentives in an environment
where the citizens use cues from the behavior of their own government and its
foreign partner to form opinions about the desirability of retaining their incumbents.
But we have no such theory, and its absence is made even more glaring by recent
studies that demonstrate that public opinion can constrain international cooperation
1. Gilligan and Johns 2012 review the literature on international cooperation. Putnam 1988 was the first
to propose the “two-level game”metaphor about domestic constraints. Milner 1997; Tarar 2001 study pos-
sible mechanisms that implement it.
2. Slantchev 2006.
3. There is, of course, a well-developed literature on political business cycles that seeks to explain how a
national government could implement an economically suboptimal policy in the shadow of elections.
Drazen 2001. However, the absence of a foreign actor similarly makes it unsuitable for our purposes.
Franzese 2002. Moreover, its approach is to focus on uncertainty over what policies the government
that wins the election would pursue rather than on uncertainty over whether the policies the incumbent
has implemented are appropriate (a key to explaining strategic delays).
4 International Organization
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during electoral periods on other issues as well, especially when the issues are
salient.4
In this way, a particular historical puzzle has identified a theoretical lacuna that we
aim to fill. Upon some reflection, it is not hard to see how the need for such a mech-
anism can arise more generally. Consider any situation where governments must
cooperate on some international policy, where the distribution of costs is basically
clear (because of existing agreements or because the policy is governed by the
rules of an international organization), and where incumbents face domestic elections
but voters are uncertain about the desirability of that policy. Some examples of such
policies are peacekeeping missions, multilateral foreign aid, environmental protec-
tion, climate change, and financial rescue packages. The government’s fundamental
problem is not to negotiate a better deal for itself but to persuade its own citizens
either that the policy is necessary (when it wishes to implement it) or that it is not
(when it wishes to avoid it), to free itself for the policy stance it prefers while simul-
taneously securing its reelection.
The international dimension complicates this calculus because the foreign actor,
which is responding to its own domestic concerns, might act in a way that prevents
the government from signaling credibly enough to move the beliefs of its voters in the
direction it wants. Sometimes, the fear of electoral defeat might lock the government
into a policy it did not want and, more importantly, that the voters would not have
wanted either. At other times, it might keep the government disciplined enough to
implement the policy the citizens prefer even though the policy is contrary to its
own wishes. It could also be the case that the foreign actor’s behavior unfetters the
government so it could implement its desired policy and retain office even though
voters would have opposed the policy had they been sufficiently informed about it.
Disentangling the conditions that give rise to these various outcomes requires one
to analyze the incentives of the governments, the motivations of the citizens, and their
interaction. In our model, two governments are faced with a situation whose harmful
effects might require taking a (potentially cooperative) costly action to ameliorate.
The citizens in each country want the action taken only if the situation warrants it
but are not sure whether this is the case. They do know that their governments
might have proclivities to act in circumstances they would not want them to, and
they also know that the governments have better information about the necessity
of taking action. The citizens, then, wish to furnish the government with appropriate
electoral incentives by threatening to keep in office only an incumbent whose behav-
ior was in line with their preferences. For such an electoral threat to work, the citizens
must form some beliefs about the appropriateness of what their government has (or
has not) done, and the problem is that citizens do not have much information to
work with. All that we can observe is whether the government takes the action; the
policy effects are not observable until after the elections. For their part, the govern-
ments wish to signal that their behavior is appropriate but since they all want to stay in
4. Schneider 2013.
The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation 5
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office their ability to signal credibly is severely compromised. Thus, the model incor-
porates a cooperation problem between the governments, an agency problem between
the citizens and their government, and a signaling problem between the government
and its citizens.
We focus on results from the model that are directly relevant to the empirical
puzzle we set out to resolve. Space constraints prevent us from exploring the rich
set of insights that the full analysis reveals but we have documented them in the
online supplements.5 Generally speaking, it is quite difficult for the citizens to incen-
tivize the governments through an instrument as blunt as elections. For wide ranges of
the parameters, the interaction must involve some sort of policy failure where the
governments behave contrary to the wishes of the citizens. At one extreme is the
“false-positive” equilibrium where the governments act regardless of the necessity
of doing so. This can happen when the citizens in both countries strongly believe
that action is appropriate, which allows the governments to take advantage of the
favorable circumstances and (cooperatively) implement the policy they desire
(Proposition 2). If the citizens in only one of the countries hold this belief, then a
second problem is added to the policy failure: not only does their own government
act even when it is not supposed to, but it can be forced to bear the cost of the
policy by the other government (Proposition B). In this “burden-shifting” equilib-
rium, the domestic agency problem gets exported as an international free-rider
problem. Finally, if the citizens in both countries strongly believe that action is inap-
propriate, the electoral incentives become truly perverse because they can end up
blocking international action even when it is necessary. In this “false-negative” equi-
librium, which can exist only if the costs of inaction are not too high, governments
become prisoners of citizen expectations: since they get punished even when they
do the right thing, they do the wrong one (Proposition 3).
The Model
Two countries, i∈ {1, 2}, are faced with a crisis that can potentially require costly
measures to resolve. The timing of the game is as follows: the governments,
Gi, observe the severity of the crisis they are dealing with and simultaneously
decide whether to act or not. The median voter in each country observes these
public actions and the voters simultaneously decide whether to retain the incumbent.
Voting is costless. After the elections, the (possibly new) governments again decide
whether to implement crisis policy, after which the game ends and payoffs are
realized.
5. In these supplements we also present two applications of the model to other cases: Slovakia’s burden-
shifting in the summer of 2010, and Germany’s supposed delay of the third Greek bailout during the
summer of 2013.
6 International Organization
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Economic Environment
Without a policy to stop it, a crisis can be either mild, in which case it inflicts on
country i economic damages worth θi > 0, or serious, in which case it inflicts
damages wiθi with wi > 1. Citizens and governments are equally sensitive to eco-
nomic damages. The governments know the type of crisis they are dealing with
but the citizens in both countries do not: they believe that it is serious with probability
s∈ (0, 1) and mild with complementary probability. This prior is common know-
ledge. The results do not depend on the governments being fully informed, just
that they have better information than the citizens. Whereas a mild crisis fizzles
out without a government action, a serious crisis continues to inflict cumulative
damages until someone acts to stop it. If at least one of the governments acts prior
to the elections, then the crisis will be resolved regardless of its type. If neither
acts, then the mild crisis will resolve itself after the elections but the serious crisis
will deepen.
The total financial cost of a crisis policy is C > 0. Consistent with our desire to
model cooperation under existing distributional rules, if the governments act together,
each country pays αi∈ (0, 1) of the total cost, with
P
αi ¼ 1. IfGi acts on its own, the
country bears the entire cost, αi = 1.6 Whereas the citizens of country i pay costs in
full, αiC, its government could either be as sensitive to these costs as they are or
less so. Letting ti∈ {1, δ} denote the type of Gi so that the government pays tiαiC
when it participates in a bailout, we call a government nationalist when ti = 1 and
internationalist when ti = δ∈ (0, 1). The government’s type is common knowledge.7
When it comes to the crisis and the reaction, the different sensitivity to the financial
cost of the policy is the sole source of preference divergence between the government
and its citizens:8
Assumption 1: Citizens in each country want the governments to intervene if, and
only if, the crisis is severe even when there is an agreement to share the financial
costs: θi < αiC < C < wiθi.
6. This represents distributional conflict in reduced form: the governments effectively get to choose
whether to pay nothing, pay everything, or pay an intermediate amount set by αi. It is not necessary to
endogenize αi because once its terms are set, the game would proceed as specified, and we can study its
equilibrium comparative statics. Doing so does not alter our substantive conclusions. The reduced form
also happens to be appropriate for the EU context, where contributions are preset by existing rules (as
with almost any financial matter, they are tied to the size of the economy and calculated with a known
ECB formula) and not determined by ad hoc negotiations.
7. These labels merely reflect whether, all else equal, a particular government has stronger incentives to
act in a crisis than its median citizen.
8. There is little to be gained from assuming that voter preferences differ in their willingness to support a
policy. In such a model, the votes would be partitioned into those who support or oppose the policy regard-
less of their beliefs about the crisis, and those who support it only if they believe the crisis is serious with
high probability. The latter are the only ones the government would need to signal to, and it is the case we
examine. While the contours of the parameter sets that support various equilibria will depend on the dis-
tribution of preferences in the population, the equilibria themselves—and our substantive insights—will
remain.
The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation 7
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This assumption also implies that regardless of the government’s type, both the
government and its citizens prefer to have an international cost-sharing agreement
in place if that government is going to implement a crisis policy. If they expect the
other government to implement the policy, then they have an incentive to shift the
entire burden to the other country and reap only the benefits, raising the specter of
free riding.
Political Environment
Governments value being in power, which we represent by adding 1 to their payoffs if
they are reelected. Citizens value that their government behaves according to their
preferences. Since citizens are not informed about the nature of the crisis, they can
use only the observable behavior of the governments to make inferences about the
desirability of that behavior. In particular, they form posterior beliefs about the
type of crisis and then ask whether their government’s action was appropriate or
not. They then reward or punish the incumbent depending on this inferred behavior.
There are four contingencies in which citizens of the two countries can find them-
selves when they vote (since they have a common prior and any new information
that might be revealed from the governmental actions is symmetric, the posteriors
would have to be the same).9 Let sa1a2 be the citizens’ common belief that the
crisis is severe when they observe government i taking action ai∈ {0, 1}. For
example, s01 denotes their belief after a unilateral action by G2. Citizens credit the
government that acts in proportion to their belief that the crisis is serious, and the gov-
ernment that does not act in proportion to their belief that the crisis is mild. In our
example, G2 will be credited with s01 whereas G1 will be credited with 1− s01.
When citizens apportion credit, they compare their posterior beliefs to what they
expect to get from the alternative government they could select, ei∈ (0, 1). This base-
line expectation captures how contested the elections in country i are expected to be.
Very low values represent cases where the incumbent is favored to win the elections
whereas very high values represent cases where the incumbent is compromised and
unlikely to win. Intermediate values represent competitive elections where neither has
a clear advantage.
Payoffs
Payoffs are realized at the end of the game, and are as follows.
9. Empirically, Keyser and Peress 2013 show that voters often punish incumbent governments when the
economy in only their country contracts but are much less likely to do so when many economies contract.
This suggests that voters pay attention to international context and that their assessments of economic per-
formance are consistent across countries.
8 International Organization
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Multilateral action. The crisis is resolved regardless of type, no economic costs are
incurred, the financial costs are shared, and no further action is taken after the elec-
tions. The citizens in i obtain a payoff of s11− αiC if they keep the incumbent and
ei− αiC if they replace it. The government in country i gets 1− tiαiC if it is reelected,
and −tiαiC if not.
Unilateral action by Gi. The crisis is resolved regardless of type, no economic
costs are incurred, the financial costs are borne entirely by country i, and no
further action is taken after the elections. The citizens in i get a payoff of sa1a2  C
if they keep the incumbent and ei−C if they replace it, whereas the citizens in −i
get a payoff of 1 sa1a2 if they keep the incumbent and e−i if they replace it. The gov-
ernment in country i gets 1− ti C if it is reelected, and −ti C if it is not. The govern-
ment in country −i gets 1 if reelected, and 0 if it is not.
No action. If the crisis is mild, it is resolved, θi economic costs are incurred, and no
financial costs are incurred. The citizens in i obtain a payoff of 1− s00− θi. The gov-
ernment obtains 1− θi if reelected and −θi if it is not.
If the crisis is serious, it deepens, and wiθi economic costs are incurred. Since the
severity is now revealed and citizens always want such crises acted upon, we assume
that whatever governments are in place will reach an agreement on multilateral action,
and the costs of such a program will be distributed according to the existing fixed rule.
The citizens in country i get a payoff of 1− s00− wiθi− αiC. The government in
country i gets a payoff of 1− wiθi− tiαiC if reelected and −wiθi− tiαiC otherwise.
Preference constraints
We can now define the preferences of the governments more precisely so that elec-
tions become meaningful in the model:
Assumption 2: A nationalist government strictly prefers to cooperate in a multilateral
policy if doing so ensures its reelection and if it expects to lose office after unilateral
action by the other government: αiC < 1.
Assumption 3: All else equal, an internationalist government strictly prefers to inter-
vene unilaterally in a mild crisis rather than to allow it to continue, but strictly prefers
to allow it to continue if doing so ensures its reelection and if acting unilaterally
results in its removal from office: δC < θi < 1 + δC. Note that (A1) and (A2) together
imply that θi < 1 as well.
Equilibrium Refinements
The solution concept is weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which requires only that
strategies are sequentially rational given beliefs and that beliefs are consistent with
The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation 9
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the strategies and derived by Bayes rule whenever possible. These requirements do
not put any meaningful restrictions on admissible beliefs after events that are not sup-
posed to occur when equilibrium strategies are followed, which essentially permits
any subsequent behavior to be rationalized. Since expectations about actions after
zero-probability events can be crucial in supporting equilibrium behavior, we
would like to ensure that these beliefs are at least plausible. To this end, we shall
require that the assessment satisfies something analogous to the Intuitive Criterion:10
Definition 1: An equilibrium is intuitive if (a) there exists no deviation that can profit
only the deviating player only when the crisis is of a particular type given that the
citizens infer that the crisis is of that type, and (b) for any deviation that can unilat-
erally induce an outcome with positive probability only when the crisis is of a partic-
ular type, the citizens infer that the crisis is of that type.
Weak perfect Bayesian equilibria are merely a subset of Nash equilibria, and as
such define rationality in a strictly individualist manner: the equilibrium requirements
eliminate strategy profiles vulnerable to unilateral deviations. Although this defini-
tion of rationality might be appropriate when it comes to the citizens in the two coun-
tries who cannot be expected to coordinate to deviate together, it is less persuasive
when it comes to the two governments. Since governments can meet in private,
they could conceivably conspire to hide information from their citizens. In the
model, citizens have only the actions they can observe to go on when making infer-
ences. But what if governments collude to take advantage of this? We shall require
that the equilibrium be immune to such collusion:
Definition 2: An equilibrium is collusion proof if there exists no group deviation by
the governments such that (a) the payoffs from the deviation Pareto-dominate the
equilibrium payoffs, and (b) no government can benefit from deviating from the col-
lusive agreement.
Analysis
We begin by establishing our benchmark case: an equilibrium in which governments
agree to a multilateral action only when the crisis is serious and do nothing if it is
mild. This is the behavior citizens want, so we shall call this the citizen-preferred
equilibrium (CPE). In it, the governments are always rewarded with reelection fol-
lowing multilateral action because the citizens believe that the action was appropriate.
Unfortunately, as the following proposition shows, this happy state of affairs is
unlikely unless both governments are nationalist.
10. Cho and Kreps 1987.
10 International Organization
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Proposition 1: The citizen-preferred equilibrium can always be supported in a nation-
alist dyad, but can be supported in internationalist or mixed dyads only when govern-
ments are jointly vulnerable electorally (e1 + e2≥ 1). It is intuitive in all dyads but
collusion-proof only in nationalist and mixed dyads.
This result establishes somewhat dim prospects for disciplining governments
through electoral sanctions.11 Internationalist governments cannot be prevented
from colluding to act even in mild crises. Governments with heterogeneous prefer-
ences can be induced to act in accordance with citizen preferences but only if they
are jointly vulnerable electorally. It is only nationalist governments that can be
relied upon to do what the citizens want them to despite the electoral vulnerability
and the possibility for collusive agreements.
When the CPE does not exist, any equilibrium must involve some type of policy
failure: either a false positive (governments intervene when they are not supposed to),
or a false negative (governments do not intervene even when they are supposed to).
In the context of the EU, the “democratic deficit” is often alleged to arise from the
Union being a “distant technocratic superstate run by powerful officials who collude
with national governments to circumvent national political processes,” presumably
with the end result being policies that the citizens do not want.12 From this perspective,
the most interesting false-positive failure is the one where the two governments agree to
act in a mild crisis and share the policy burden. As the following proposition shows, one
does not need the EU “superstate” to explain such outcomes: electorally minded national
governments are perfectly capable of going against their citizens’willwithout any further
institutional obfuscation. The central result here is that electoral incentives could drive
even nationalist governments to such hyperactive engagement but that the more elector-
ally vulnerable the incumbent gets, the smaller the chances of such policy failure are.
Proposition 2: The following assessments constitute a false-positive burden-sharing
equilibrium only if s  s ¼ maxðe1; e2Þ:
• Each government acts regardless of the nature of the crisis.
• The citizens in each country reelect the incumbent when they observe multilateral
action. When they observe any other outcome, they infer that the crisis is serious,
reelect any government that acts, and replace any government that does not.
This equilibrium is collusion-proof and intuitive.
When citizens are quite certain that the crisis is serious, they are going to reward
action and punish inaction even if they are still unsure about the precise nature of the
11. All formal statements of propositions and their proofs are in Appendix A.
12. Moravcsik encapsulates this notion while offering a potent critique of its empirical foundations 2008,
331.
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crisis. Internationalist governments obviously benefit from this because they get to
have their cake (they act) and eat it too (they get reelected) even though they are,
in fact, acting against the wishes of the citizens when the crisis is mild. The electoral
threat forces even nationalist governments to fall in line and participate when neither
they nor, ironically, their citizens actually want to.
Citizens are, of course, quite aware that they might be precipitating the very behav-
ior they are trying to prevent and they are willing to do so only if they believe that the
probability of such a mistake is low. This is why a necessary condition for this equi-
librium is for them to think that it is very likely that the crisis is serious and requires
action (s is high enough). With such a belief they are willing to reelect their govern-
ment even though there is a chance that it has acted contrary to their wishes. When the
incumbent is more vulnerable electorally, their tolerance for such a mistake becomes
lower (because the replacement they can elect is more attractive), which pushes the
required initial beliefs further up.
False-positive failures are not restricted to burden-sharing arrangements. As the
somewhat tedious analysis in Appendix A shows, when at least one of the govern-
ments is internationalist, equilibria with distributional conflict exist in which an inter-
nationalist government ends up paying the entire cost on its own (the burden-shifting
equilibrium in Proposition B), or is at least forced to assume that burden dispropor-
tionately often (the limited burden-sharing equilibrium in Proposition C). Aside from
showing that nationalist governments cannot be induced to carry more than their
share, these cases do not add much of substantive significance to our analysis
although the extreme burden-shifting scenario could be useful in understanding
Slovakia’s behavior (Appendix C).
It is the false-negative failure, however, that is of special relevance to the puzzle we set
out to resolve, which is why we focus on it. We now investigate the possibility that gov-
ernments do too little; namely, that they fail to act not only when the crisis is mild—as
their citizens want them to—but also when the crisis is serious. This is a particularly
egregious type of policy failure because it saddles the citizens with a deepening crisis
that they will eventually have to pay to resolve. The central result is that electoral con-
cerns could keep even internationalist governments from acting when the crisis is serious
but the more vulnerable the incumbent, the less likely such policy failure becomes.
Proposition 3: The following assessments constitute a false-negative equilibrium
only if s  s ¼ minð1 e1; 1 e2Þ and wi  wi ¼ 1þ tið1 αiÞC½ =θi:
• No government acts regardless of the nature of the crisis.
• The citizens in each country reelect the incumbent when they observe inaction.
When they observe any other outcome, they infer that the crisis is mild, reelect
any government that does not act, and replace any government that does.
The equilibrium is collusion-proof but it is intuitive only for internationalist dyads.
■
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This result should be jarring for it states that while internationalist dyads can ex-
perience this type of policy failure, dyads where at least one of the governments
is nationalist cannot. To put it differently, it is only when both governments are
internationalist—and thus very interested in acting regardless of the nature of the
crisis—that a serious crisis might remain unattended with both governments remain-
ing passive for electoral reasons. Ironically, this sort of massive policy failure that
will saddle the hapless voters with the costs of a rescue from a wider and deeper
crisis cannot occur when at least one of the governments is nationalist.
How do we explain this puzzling behavior? The answer lies in the underlying
incentives of internationalist and nationalist governments. As long as it is rewarded
for inaction, a nationalist government does not have an incentive to act when the
crisis is mild even if doing so would also result in reelection. When voters observe
such a government acting unexpectedly, they can safely infer that the crisis is
serious, in which case they can also reelect it for doing the right thing, which, in
turn, rationalizes its unexpected deviation. Unlike the nationalist government, an
internationalist government cannot credibly signal that the crisis is serious in this
way. If it expects to be rewarded for deviating, it will have an incentive to do so
even if the crisis is mild, which means that when voters observe such a government
acting unexpectedly, they cannot safely infer that the crisis is serious so they will not
reelect the government. This, in turn, prevents the internationalist government from
acting even in a serious crisis. In other words, since the internationalist government
cannot credibly signal what it knows, the citizens cannot be induced to remove the
electoral threat that is preventing the government from acting. Internationalist gov-
ernments are prisoners of voter expectations: because they are known to want to
do too much, they are condemned to do too little.
It is worth asking why this equilibrium is not susceptible to internationalist govern-
ments colluding to act even when they know that the crisis is serious. It is not really
the threat to punish them both if they engage in multilateral action that prevents col-
lusion. It is the lack of incentives to abide by the collusive agreement that is destroy-
ing its viability. In this equilibrium voters always reward the inaction of their own
government regardless of what the other government does. This means that if govern-
ments agree to act in a serious crisis, each of them can do better by breaking their
promise and doing nothing: whoever does this will both get reelected and saddle
its erstwhile co-conspirator with the full cost of the action. The collusive agreement
cannot be sustained, and internationalist governments end up doing nothing.
We now show how the model can rationalize Merkel’s dithering strategy and
explain both its sudden collapse and the electoral disaster that followed.
The German Politics of the Greek Bailout
The problems with Greece began in earnest shortly after the snap elections that
brought a new socialist government to power in 2009. Prime Minister George
Papandreou revealed that the previous governments had seriously mismanaged the
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economy and saddled the country with a crushing debt of 129.7 percent of GDP and a
massive deficit of 12.7 percent of GDP. The debt was more than twice the size
Eurozone members were allowed to incur, and the budget deficit was more than
four times the agreed limits. The markets reacted immediately. Rating agencies
began downgrading the Greek debt, and by the early spring of 2010, the government
was effectively shut out of the international financial markets. Rumors about a poten-
tial agreement on a bailout for Greece spread through the Eurozone despite the clear
“no bailout clause” in article 125 of the EU treaties. Any impetus for a concerted
international action, however, foundered on Germany’s stiff, if unexpected,
opposition.
How are we to understand the German government’s behavior? Scholars, politi-
cians, and the media have advanced three explanations for Merkel’s dithering. The
first was a policy blunder: Merkel had made a huge mistake in believing that the
crisis would not affect the Eurozone, and by the time markets proved her wrong,
the crisis had nearly gotten out of hand. The second, argued by the chancellor
herself (albeit only in retrospect), was that the delay was a strategy designed to
coerce other governments to implement the right policies. These explanations are
not consistent with the evidence during the critical months of March and April.
A third explanation turns on electoral motivations: Merkel tried to postpone what
she knew would be a highly unpopular, but necessary, decision until after the elec-
tions in the country’s most populous state, Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW), on 9
May. These elections were critical to Merkel’s governing coalition because a
defeat for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in NRW would lead to a loss of
control in the Bundesrat. This would jeopardize her government’s plans for a
radical overhaul of the tax and health systems, and an extension of the nuclear
power program. These plans were opposed by the Social Democratic Party (SPD).
Public opinion polls in NRW indicated a close race between the SPD and the
CDU, and opinion poll experts predicted that the bailout debate could have a
strong impact on voters.13 These elections were so important that some analysts
argued that all federal politics had come to a standstill because decisions had been
either made or postponed because of them. Not only that, but NRW was “historically
speaking, a seismograph for national politics.”14
13. Michael Bröcker and Frank Vollmer, “Griechenland Entscheidet dieWahl: Umfragen Zeigen Kopf-
an-Kopf-Rennen” [Greece is Decisive for the Election: Surveys Show Neck-and-Neck Race], RP Online, 8
May 2010, retrieved from <http://www.rp-online.de/nrw/landespolitik/griechenland-entscheidet-die-wahl-
aid-1.877336>.
14. Jess Smee, “The World from Berlin: ‘Merkel’s Coalition Remains in Stand-By Mode’,” Der Spiegel
Online, 18 March 2010, retrieved from <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-
berlin-merkels-coalition-remains-in-stand-by-mode-a-684340.html>; “German Voters Poised to Punish
Merkel Party Over Greece,” Agence France-Presse, 8 May 2010, retrieved from <http://www.expatica.
com/de/news/Germanvoters-poised-to-punish-Merkel-party-over-Greece_176477.html>.
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There was no shortage of speculation about an electoral motivation behind
Merkel’s delay, both in Germany and abroad.15 The opposition was especially
vocal in its allegations that a bailout was a foregone conclusion.16 But it is one
thing to assert that a political leader postponed the implementation of an unpopular
decision until after an election, and it is quite another to explain why this strategy
should work. How could citizens not see through such a transparent ploy? If a
bailout was inevitable, putting it off would be, in the prescient words of the EU
Green Party Leader Cohn-Bendit, “incomprehensible and politically very stupid.”17
Our model can help explain why Merkel’s electoral strategy made sense.
Equilibrium Selection
The first step in applying the model is to select among its several equilibria on the
basis of the parameters necessary for their existence. From the vantage point of the
German government, the situation between 11 January (when Eurostat officially
questioned the Greek debt and deficit figures) and 27 April (when S&P downgraded
Greek and Portuguese bonds) is consistent with parameter values that map onto the
false-negative equilibrium. Recall that this equilibrium requires (1) an internationalist
dyad, (2) citizens believing that the crisis does not require a bailout, and (3) costs of a
serious crisis not being excessive.
First, given the express concerns of the other important Eurozone members and
their ready willingness to participate in a common bailout early on, we can regard
them as internationalist. Both the CDU and Angela Merkel were also regarded as
internationalist. In fact, in party manifestos and expert evaluations, German govern-
ments tend to come out as more internationalist than other EU governments in
general.18 Merkel in particular had earned the nickname “Mrs. Europe” for her excep-
tional handling of the previously gridlocked negotiations for the 2007–13 financial
framework.
Second, German voters did not believe that the Greek crisis was serious enough to
affect their own well-being, and were consequently opposed to a bailout. Most of
them believed that bailing out the Greeks was both unfair and unnecessary. While
their chancellor was telling them that Greece would solve its own problems, the
media was regaling them with stories of astounding Greek government largesse
15. “Die Bundeskanzlerin Versucht, Zeit zu Gewinnen” [Chancellor Tries to Buy Time], Badische
Zeitung, 26 April 2010, retrieved from <http://www.badische-zeitung.de/wirtschaft-3/die-bundeskan-
zlerin-versucht-zeit-zu-gewinnen--30135537.html>.
16. “Steinmeier Kritisiert Merkels Griechenland-Politik” [Steinmeier Criticizes Merkel’s Policy on
Greece], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 April 2010, retrieved from <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirt-
schaft/eurokrise/verzoegerungs-vorwuerfe-steinmeier-kritisiert-merkels-griechenland-politik-1969913.html>.
17. “Germany Policy Toward Greece ‘Very Stupid’: Cohn-Bendit,” Agence France-Presse, 26 April
2010, retrieved from <http://www.expatica.com/de/news/Germany-policy-toward-Greece-very-stupid-
Cohn-Bendit_173298.html>.
18. Warntjen, Hix, and Crombez 2008.
The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation 15
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
00
20
81
83
17
00
04
06
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 IP
 a
dd
re
ss
: 1
73
.2
39
.1
98
.1
18
, o
n 
31
 Ja
n 
20
18
 a
t 2
2:
42
:0
8,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
and endemic corruption.19 The examples of this are too numerous to cite, but one
egregious example provides a useful encapsulation of the issues and a glimpse at
the tenor. On the day of Papandreou’s 5 March visit to Berlin, Bild published an
inflammatory “Dear prime minister” open letter full of assorted accusations:
If you’re reading this, you’ve entered a country different from yours. You’re in
Germany. Here, people work until they are 67 and there is no 14th-month salary
for civil servants. Here, nobody needs to pay a €1,000 bribe to get a hospital bed
in time. Our petrol stations have cash registers, taxi drivers give receipts and
farmers don’t swindle EU subsidies with millions of non-existent olive trees.
Germany also has high debts but we can settle them. That’s because we get
up early and work all day. We want to be friends with the Greeks. That’s
why since joining the euro, Germany has given your country €50 billion.20
Given these sentiments, most Germans instinctively approved of the schwäbische
Hausfrau strategy that Merkel had debuted in 2008 when she warned that doling
out credit to rescue the American finance sector would exacerbate the meltdown
caused by the bursting of the real estate bubble. For wide swaths of the population,
fear of inflation and aversion to debt had become part of a culture that emphasized
frugality and solvency.21 Many Germans believed that a bailout would endanger
the stability of the Euro rather than support it.
It should, therefore, come as no surprise that the Germans were dead set against a
bailout, in part because of austerity measures that had been necessary to meet fiscal
consolidation targets in Germany.22 Polls consistently showed that only 20 to 25
percent supported helping Greece, and Germans tended to be distant outliers com-
pared to other Europeans on the causes and consequences of the crisis.23 In March,
an IFOP survey reported that 78 percent of Germans believed that the Greek govern-
ment was responsible for the crisis rather that it being part of a global crisis or a result
of financial speculation. The average of those who shared that sentiment among those
surveyed in Spain, France, Italy, and the UK was only 54 percent. The majority of
Germans also did not think that the crisis was significant either personally or to
those around them: 55 percent compared to an average of 36 percent among the
other Europeans. Germans were also far more confident that their country could
not suffer the same fate as Greece: 66 percent compared to an average of only 41
percent for the others. Since they blamed the Greeks for the crisis and did not
believe it would affect them, 76 percent did not want to help Greece. Majorities in
19. Mylonas 2012; Tzogopoulos 2013.
20. “Get Up Earlier, Germans Tell Greeks,” The Guardian, 5 March 2010, retrieved from <http://www.
theguardian.com/business/2010/mar/05/bild-open-letter-greece-papandreou>.
21. Lynn 2011.
22. Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit 2014.
23. “Poll Finds 57%ofGermans OpposeGreekAid,”Agence France-Presse, 27April 2010, retrieved from
<http://www.expatica.com/de/news/Poll-finds-57-percent-of-Germans-oppose-Greek-aid_173437.html>.
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Italy (67%), Spain (55%), and France (53%) thought that their governments should
help Greece in the interests of European solidarity. The only citizens the Germans
resembled in their hawkishness on the bailout were the British (78% opposed), but
the UK was not a member of the Eurozone.24 In fact, about a third of the Germans
would rather see Greece expelled from the Eurozone than pay to bail out its govern-
ment, and in this sentiment they again exceeded everyone else.25
Third, the costs of continuing a serious crisis were not seen as excessive by polit-
ical elites and publics alike. By March, the other Eurozone members and the IMF had
reached a consensus that the crisis was serious, but in their initial bailout agreement
from 11 April they estimated that only about EUR45 billion in loans would be suf-
ficient to rescue Greece. The EUR15 billion IMF share was comparable to its
loans to Brazil 1999 and Mexico in 1994, and the overall package was akin to the
bailout for Argentina in 2001. In other words, while the crisis was clearly serious
from a Eurozone perspective, it was perceived as manageable. The economic costs
were also not expected to be grievous—the Greeks did not even request the activation
of the emergency loans under this agreement until 23 April, and the credit ratings on
government bonds in Greece itself but also in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain (the
PIIGS countries where the crisis was most likely to spill into) remained at investment-
grade levels until 27 or 28 April.
The Schwäbische Hausfrau Policy
In line with the equilibrium logic, Merkel adopted a laissez-faire policy. This position
was not difficult to sustain in the early months while the crisis seemed localized and
within Athens’ ability to stem. Members of the government, the coalition parties, and
leading newspapers all insisted that Greece should cope alone.26 The EU Council
meeting on 11 February limited itself to assurances of political support for Greek
reforms while emphasizing the need to abide by the rules. Even when the situation
in Greece took a turn for the worse amid nationwide protests against the austerity
program of 5 March, the Eurogroup refused to commit to any financial help and
instead pressed for further austerity measures.
In exasperation, Papandreou warned that Greece might have no choice but to turn
to the IMF for help if the Eurogroup did not put together a rescue package at the EU
summit scheduled for 25 March. His particular concern was that the waffling EU
response had fanned the flames of speculation, causing Greek bond yields to top 6
percent. At such an exorbitant rate, Athens had no hope of financing itself via the
markets out of the crisis. The only way to stop the betting against Greek debt was
24. Fourquet and Bonneval 2010.
25. Ralph Atkins, “Athens Crisis Highlights Pressure on Merkel,” Financial Times, 21 March 2010,
retrieved from <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/57f5217c-350e-11df-9cfb-00144feabdc0.html>.
26. Meiers 2015, 18.
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through a firm commitment to a bailout by the Eurogroup or, failing that, assurances
of loans from the IMF.27 Everyone—markets, Eurogroup finance ministers, the head
of the OECD, and the president of the European Commission—agreed with him.
Everyone, that is, except the Germans.28
Reflecting both the moral hazard perspective and the widespread popular opposi-
tion to a bailout, Merkel told the Bundestag on 17 March that rushing aid to Greece in
“a quick act of solidarity” was wrong, and that a fundamental solution has to be
devised; a solution that would allow for the expulsion from the eurozone of countries
that persistently break its financial rules.29 When the inevitable hue and cry arose
over breeching the expulsion taboo, Merkel reminded everyone that Greece had
yet to ask for financial aid, insisted that she did not believe the country was facing
imminent insolvency, and flatly stated that any discussion of a bailout was off the
table for the upcoming EU summit.30
Consequently, the statement released at the 25 March summit harped, much like its
11 February predecessor, on the need to follow the rules, but went further by prom-
ising “a package involving substantial IMF financing and a majority of European
financing.”31 This seemed to have committed the Eurogroup to a bailout and satisfied
Germany’s demand to get the IMF involved. On the other hand, the statement also
insisted that since Greece had not requested any financial help, the rescue mechanism
was not being activated. It also emphasized that the loans would be at nonconcession-
ary rates, that they would be provided only as an absolutely last resort, and that their
provision would require the unanimous consent of the euro area members after
assessments by the Commission and the Central Bank.32 The official statement
from the Chancellor’s Office, however, chose to emphasize just how hedged that
promise was. In only thirteen sentences of text, it managed to say that the package
was a “last resort,” “very last resort,” and “absolutely last resort.” After professing
a commitment to the common currency, it clarified that any disbursements would
involve “strict criteria” and had to be “authorized unanimously,” and that the loans
would be priced “in line with the de facto risks.”33
Merkel’s tough talk on Greece brought her political gains domestically. Figure 1
shows that initial rumors of a bailout at the end of 2009 led to declining support
27. Ian Traynor, “Greek PM Gives European Leaders a Week to Produce Rescue Plan,” The Guardian,
18 March 2010, retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/mar/18/greek-pm-gives-eu-
leaders-rescue-deadline>.
28. Charles Hawley, “Barroso Demands Solidarity: Europe Increases Pressure on Chancellor Merkel,”
Der Spiegel Online, 22 March 2010, retrieved from <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/barroso-
demands-solidarity-europe-increases-pressure-on-chancellor-merkel-a-684997.html>.
29. “Merkel Wants Scope to Expel Eurozone Troublemakers,” EurActiv, 18 March 2010, retrieved from
<http://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/news/merkel-wants-scope-to-expel-eurozone-trou-
blemakers/>.
30. Quentin Peel, “Merkel Damps Bail-out Expectations,” Financial Times, 21 March 2010, retrieved
from <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/7315d8a8-34db-11df-9cfb-00144feabdc0.html>.
31. European Union 2010.
32. Ibid.
33. Bundeskanzlerin 2010.
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for Merkel. However, after her staunch opposition to the Greek bailout, support
increased and stabilized in March and April of 2010. We can see the same, even
slightly stronger, pattern in support for the CDU. This period also saw a stabilization
in the share of voters who believed that the CDU government had competently
handled the economy.
Fiddling While Rome Burns
The financial support mechanism that the Eurozone heads of state had committed to
on 25 March became fully operational on 11 April when the finance ministers pro-
vided the details along with the requirement that Greece implement further austerity
measures and report frequently on the status of their implementation. Athens imme-
diately began negotiations on the extent and severity of these additional measures. On
22 April, Eurostat revised Greece’s estimated deficit to 13.6 percent of GDP (up from
12.7 percent).34 This caused Moody’s to cut Greek bond rating to A3, citing
FIGURE 1: Public opinion in Germany during the Eurozone crisis.
34. Charles Forelle, “EU Sees Wider Greek Deficit, Roiling Markets,” The Wall Street Journal, 23 April
2010, retrieved from <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703876404575199520197362174>.
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“significant risk” and warning that the rating would slide further “unless the govern-
ment’s actions can restore confidence in the markets and counteract the prevailing
headwinds of high interest rates and low growth.”35 The ten-year bond yield
surged to an astonishing 8.8 percent, and the spread from Germany’s bond
widened by 5.75 percent. Schäuble still clung to the established narrative, claiming
in an interview in Deutschlandfunk the very same day that the Greeks would not
ask for help for weeks, perhaps until mid May.36 The Greek government formally
requested financial assistance under the new mechanism on the following day.
By the end of April, the economic and financial situation in Greece had worsened
so much that experts no longer thought that the bailout package—even if were to
come—would suffice to stem the crisis. Greece’s debt had reached almost
EUR300 billion, and after the 4 percent interest rate hike, its borrowing costs were
67 percent higher than they had been in February 2010.37 It was unlikely that
Greece would be able to service the EUR8.2 billion that were about to mature on
19 May at such prohibitive rates.38 With the country headed toward almost certain
default and financial markets in turmoil, experts predicted that a restructuring of
Greek sovereign debt was unavoidable although Schäuble denied it.39 The yields
on two-year Greek government bonds had increased to over 13 percent: it was
now safer to lend money to Iraq or Venezuela than to Greece.40
On the Road to Damascus
In this heated atmosphere, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 27 April downgrade of Greek
government debt to junk (BB+ for long-term and B for short-term bonds) and
Portugal’s to low investment grade (A−, closing on the territory previously occupied
by the Greek bonds) unleashed a veritable panic. Because the downgrade was accom-
panied by a warning that the agency expected investors to lose between 50 and 75
35. Annalyn Censky, “Another Bad Day for Greece,” CNNMoney, 22 April 2010, retrieved from <http://
money.cnn.com/2010/04/22/news/economy/greece_debt/index.htm?postversion=2010042214>.
36. Sandra Schulz, “Griechenland Muss zu “Soliden Finanzpolitischen Verhältnissen Zurückzukehren”
[Greece Has “to Return to Solid Finance-political Circumstances”], Deutschlandfunk, 24 April 2010,
retrieved from <http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/griechenland-muss-zu-soliden-finanzpolitischen.694.de.
html?dram:article_id=68442>.
37. Ian Traynor, “Markets Tremble While Merkel Plays for Time Over Greek Rescue Deal,” The
Guardian, 27 April 2010, retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/apr/26/markets-
greece-rescue-imf-package>.
38. “Pressure Mounts for Swift Greek Bailout,” Agence France-Presse, 25 April 2010, retrieved from
<http://www.smh.com.au/breaking-news-business/pressure-mounts-for-swift-greek-bailout-20100425-tkz9.
html>.
39. Adrian Pabst, “EU Can’t Afford to Let Greece Fail,” The Guardian, 9 April 2010, retrieved from
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/apr/09/greece-cant-afford-fail>.
40. Stephanie Flanders, “The Bitter Taste of a Greek Bail-Out,” BBC News, 27 April 2010, retrieved
from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/stephanieflanders/2010/04/the_bitter_taste_of_a_greek_
ba.html>.
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percent if Greece defaulted, the fallout was immediate and severe.41 European stock
markets plummeted as investors voiced fears over the crisis and the risk of conta-
gion.42 On 28 April, S&P downgraded the Spanish long-term debt to AA, and an
Italian bond issue failed to garner expected support. The borrowing costs for
Ireland, Italy, and Portugal climbed as experts became increasingly convinced that
a Greek default would unleash a series of defaults in the other PIIGS countries.43
The crisis threatened to engulf the entire Eurozone, not just its weakest members.
Sales of the euro accelerated, leading the common currency to plunge to its lowest
value against the dollar in over a year and, since the yuan was tracking the dollar,
against the Chinese currency as well.44
The heads of the IMF and the ECB turned the screws on Germany to act, empha-
sizing the “absolute necessity to decide very rapidly” and “to act swiftly and
strongly.”45 Astonishingly, even now Merkel insisted that Greece had to implement
an “ambitious” austerity program, and while she believed that the negotiations had to
be “accelerated,” it was only after they had concluded that Germany would “make its
decisions” on whether to grant aid.46 A source close to the EU Spanish presidency
indicated that the summit to discuss aid would be held on 10 May, a day after the
NRW vote.47 The peculiar scheduling would not be surprising to anyone who was
aware that the latest polls found 57 percent of Germans adamantly opposed to a
bailout (and only 33 percent in favor).48
With the ship rapidly sinking, however, political action was unavoidable. On 3
May, the German government introduced the “Act on Financial Stability within the
Monetary Union” that would clear the way for Germany’s contribution to the
bailout. The act passed on 7 May after heated debate, and became effective on the fol-
lowing day. On 9 May, the EU finance ministers assembled for an emergency meeting
approved the rescue package totaling EUR500 billion, of which Germany’s guarantees
were EUR123 billion (with a possible additional EUR24.6 billion). The IMF also
41. Jack Ewing and Jack Healy, “Cuts to Debt Rating Stir Anxiety in Europe,” The New York Times, 27
April 2010, retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/business/global/28drachma.html>.
42. “Desperate Greece Presses EU for Quick Debt Rescue,” Agence France-Presse, 27 April 2010,
retrieved from <http://www.smh.com.au/world/desperate-greece-presses-eu-for-quick-debt-rescue-20100427-
tqgz.html>.
43. “Greece Crisis: Fears Grow That It Could Spread,” BBC News, 28 April 2010, retrieved from <http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8648029.stm>.
44. Chris Buckley, “Greece Bailout Will Block Spillover—EU’s Barroso,” Reuters, 30 April 2010,
retrieved from <http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/04/30/idINIndia-48120320100430>.
45. “IMF, ECB Pressure Germany to Help Greece,” Agence France-Presse, 28 April 2010, retrieved
from <http://www.expatica.com/de/news/IMF-ECB-pressure-Germany-to-help-Greece_173762.html>.
46. “Merkel Says Greek Rescue Talks Must Be ‘Accelerated’,” Agence France-Presse, 28 April 2010,
retrieved from <http://www.expatica.com/de/news/Merkel-says-Greek-rescue-talks-must-be-accelerated_
173783.html>.
47. “Euro Leaders to Debate Greek Aid on May 10,” EUbusiness, 27 April 2010, retrieved from <http://
www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/greece-finance-aid.4bl>.
48. “Poll Finds 57% of Germans Oppose Greek Aid,” Agence France-Presse, 27 April 2010, retrieved from
<http://www.expatica.com/de/news/Poll-finds-57-percent-of-Germans-oppose-Greek-aid_173437.html>.
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approved Greece’s request for a Stand-by Arrangement of EUR30 billion, with an
immediate release of its first tranche of EUR5.5 billion to refinance the Greek
bonds maturing in ten days.
The Equilibrium Cost Condition Violated
The false-negative equilibrium can rationalize Merkel’s opposition to a bailout
despite her knowledge that the crisis was serious. However, the strategy required
her to delay all the way until after the elections and she did not. The German
bailout agreement passed in the Bundestag two days before the elections in NRW.
These elections were an unmitigated disaster for the CDU, which lost by 10.2
percent relative to its 2005 performance, making this its worst electoral defeat in
NRW ever. The government was replaced with a coalition of SPD and Greens, and
Merkel lost the majority in the Bundesrat.49 On 10 May, Merkel announced that
the long-promised tax cuts were off the table for at least two years, and on the follow-
ing day the German cabinet approved EUR123 billion for the rescue fund. The media
erupted with outrage. Bild screamed, “Yet again, we are the idiots of Europe” for
paying so much for “bankrupt neighbors” without money for tax cuts at home.50
The political ramifications of the NRW loss were not merely temporary setbacks;
they proved as costly and persistent as the gloomy forecasts had predicted. As
Figure 1 illustrates, public support for Merkel fell by more than 18 percent to an
all-time low, and support for the CDU fell to a low of 31 percent. Support for
Merkel would not recover to the (uncharacteristically low) levels of the immediate
pre-crisis months for two years, and support for the CDU would take even longer.
But if Merkel’s dilatory tactics were motivated by domestic political consider-
ations, why did she reverse course when she did, and why did she fail to persuade
voters that this had been the right decision?
To understand the abrupt volte-face of 2 May, we need to recall that one of the ne-
cessary conditions for this equilibrium is that the expected costs of a serious crisis that
is allowed to deepen are not excessive. When this condition is not met, then the gov-
ernment will have an incentive to deviate in a serious crisis and agree to a bailout even
if doing so would cost it the elections. The unexpected downgrades on 27 and 28
April, with their devastating implications for the Eurozone, were catalytic. They con-
vinced Merkel not only that the costs of the crisis would be significantly worse than
expected but that the situation was deteriorating much more rapidly than she had
anticipated. This made further delay tantamount to permitting the Eurozone to go
to ruin. Merkel’s original dilatory strategy was thus no longer optimal.
49. “Merkel Government Sees ‘Double Debacle’ in Pivotal Poll,” Agence France-Presse, 10 May 2010,
retrieved from <http://www.expatica.com/de/news/Merkel-government-sees-double-debacle-in-pivotal-
poll_176713.html>.
50. “German Cabinet Approves Euro Crisis Fund,” Agence France-Presse, 11 May 2010, retrieved from
<http://www.expatica.com/de/news/German-cabinet-approves-euro-crisis-fund_177192.html>.
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It is crucial to realize that Merkel’s tactic was predicated on there being no drastic
changes in Greece’s position. Had the downgrade been anticipated, it would have
been incorporated into the expectations, and the false-negative equilibrium would
have been unsustainable, implying no delay for the bailout. The S&P actions,
however, caught everyone by surprise. The IMF chief went so far as to say that
the rating agencies should not be “believed too much.”51 Merkel promised to
“press for the creation of a ratings agency in Europe so that European financial
markets become more stable and reactive.”52 As this official annoyance at S&P’s
actions shows, policymakers had not anticipated the downgrade.53
The unexpected downgrade put the chancellor in a quandary. She had spent the last
few months telling the Germans that the Greek crisis was not their problem, that the
Greeks had to get their act together, and that German taxpayers would not be held
liable for the excesses of the Greek government. By all accounts, she had succeeded
marvelously. The problem Merkel now confronted was that while she was convinced
that the crisis was serious for Germany, the voters clung to their original beliefs.54
With these beliefs, they would treat a bailout as a deviation and punish it accordingly.
The only way to avoid this would be to persuade them to revise their beliefs. Given
the parameter configuration (all else equal except much higher costs, wi), if voters
were to believe that the crisis is serious with a higher probability, s, the equilibrium
would be the burden-sharing one in which the governments act and get reelected.
The Unsuccessful Attempt to Coordinate on a New Equilibrium
With everything that was at stake domestically, Merkel tried very hard to persuade
German voters that the bailout was crucial for the German economy. The German
government switched to damage-control mode almost immediately after the second
downgrade. Schäuble now insisted that loans for Greece were good for
Germany.55 Merkel doubled down and said
It is about nothing more and nothing less than the future of Europe, and therefore
the future of Germany in Europe…A good European is not necessarily the one
who helps quickly. A good European is the one who respects the European
51. “IMF Warns Against Rating Agencies After Spain Downgrade,” Agence France-Presse, 28 April
2010, retrieved from <http://www.expatica.com/es/news/IMF-warns-against-rating-agencies-after-Spain-
downgrade_173814.html>.
52. “Merkel Backs Greece But Demands Change,” Agence France-Presse, 3 May 2010, retrieved from
<http://www.thelocal.de/20100503/26945>.
53. James Kanter, “EU Officials Irked by Greek Downgrade,” The New York Times, 28 April 2010,
retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/business/global/29rating.html>.
54. Eric Graydon, “Germany Finds Bailing Out Is Hard to Do,” BBC News, 28 April 2010, retrieved
from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10090578>.
55. Rob Turner, “Aid for Greece Won’t Put Squeeze on Germany, Says Schaeuble,” DW, 29 April 2010,
retrieved from <http://www.dw.com/en/aid-for-greece-wont-put-squeeze-on-germany-says-schaeuble/a-
5517080>.
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treaties and the relevant national law, and helps accordingly to ensure the stabil-
ity of the Eurozone.56
She went on a veritable media blitz with news conferences and interviews on the day
the Eurozone members approved the bailout package.57 She made fifteen personal
appearances in NRW alone and spent the week before the election giving numerous
interviews on television.58
The voters were not buying it. Since June 2009, the fraction of Germans who
thought that the current economic situation was good or very good had been steadily
increasing. The same trend obtained for the expectations about the future.59
Compared to January 2010, when 64 percent of Germans thought that the worst of
the crisis was still to come, by May only 56 percent thought so.60 In mid April, 78
percent of Germans believed that their own economic situation would either not be
affected by the crisis or improve over the next few years; 59 percent believed that
unemployment would either remain stable or decline; and 71 percent believed that
the economy would either remain as is or improve.61 Even after the bailout 56
percent of Germans continued to believe that aid to Greece was wrong (only 39
percent were in favor), and that despite 67 percent thinking that the euro would desta-
bilize over the next year.62
Recognizing the inherent weakness of the chancellor’s new position, the opposi-
tion now pounced on it, making it the most important topic in the electoral campaign
in NRW.63 As Klaus-Peter Schöppner, head of the polling institute Emnid, said, “The
issue has electrified people as seldom before and is going to play a determining role”
56. Bundesregierung, “Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel zu den Hilfen für
Griechenland” [Official Statement of the Government under Chancellor Merkel about the Financial Aid
for Greece], 5 May 2010, retrieved from <https://www.bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/
Regierungserklaerung/2010/2010-05-05-merkel-erklaerung-griechenland.html>.
57. Katharina Peters, “Wahlkampf in Letzter Minute: Rüttgers Kämpft Gegen Griechenland-Effekt”
[Last-Minute Election Campaign: Rüttgers Fights Against the Greece Effect], Der Spiegel Online, 8
May 2010, retrieved from <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/wahlkampf-in-letzter-minute-
ruettgers-kaempft-gegengriechenland-effekt-a-693779.html>.
58. “German Voters Poised to Punish Merkel Party Over Greece,” Agence France-Presse, 8 May 2010,
retrieved from <http://www.expatica.com/de/news/German-voters-poised-to-punish-Merkel-party-over-
Greece_176477.html>.
59. See the figures “Gegenwärtige wirtschaftliche Lage: Zeitverlauf” and “Zukünftige wirtschaftliche
Lage: Zeitverlauf” in Infratest Dimap 2010.
60. See the figure “Aussagen zur Krise: Der Schlimmste Teil der Krise Steht Uns Noch Bevor” in
Infratest Dimap 2011.
61. N24-Emnid, “N24-EMNID-UMFRAGE: Deutsche Vorsichtig Optimistisch—Wirtschaftliche Lage
Wird Weitgehend Stabil Eingeschätzt” [N24-EMNID-SURVEY: Germans Cautiously Optimistic—Judge
Economic Situation as Largely Stable], Presseportal, 15 April 2010, retrieved from <http://www.presse-
portal.de/pm/13399/1595863>.
62. Angelika Hellemann, “Der Schicksalstag des Euro” [Fateful Day for the Euro], Bild, 25 May 2010,
retrieved from <http://www.bild.de/politik/wirtschaft/milliarden-hilfe-griechenland-pleite-krise-12397612.
bild.html>.
63. Daniel Delhaes and Peter Müller, “SPD Nutzt die Griechenland-Krise” [SPD Utilizes the Greek
Crisis],Handelsblatt, 6 May 2010, retrieved from <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/wahl-
kampf-spd-nutztdie-griechenland-krise/3429284.html>.
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in the election.64 The last poll published by Bild on the eve of the elections showed
that 20 percent of NRW voters said that the bailout would affect their decision.65
At the end of the day, German voters had no reason—in evidence or logic—to
believe Merkel’s sudden conversion. And so they did not, treating the bailout as a
deviation in the false-negative equilibrium that required a punishment at the polls.
Two Alternative Explanations
We have now made the case that Merkel’s decisions during the Greek debt crisis were
motivated by electoral considerations. There are, however, two common alternative
explanations of her behavior that we would like to address.
A Policy Blunder?
One possible explanation interprets the delay as a failure of German politicians to see
past the cultural and ideological commitment to austerity, and a failure to understand
how financial markets could spread the Greek malady to other vulnerable members of
the Eurozone. Whereas the cultural affinity to austerity policies and the popular fear
of inflation certainly did not make it easier for the German government to commit to a
bailout, there are two problems with this explanation.
First, it requires one to maintain that Merkel had been singularly deluded when
other governments, the EU Commission, and the IMF were all in agreement that
the Greeks needed a bailout. European leaders urged Merkel not to delay the
bailout to Greece, but to act in solidarity with other members of the Eurozone. It is
difficult to see how Merkel and her ministers could have been so out of touch with
market reality, especially in late April when they still maintained that Germany
could refuse to aid Greece.
Moreover, if the German government did not care about the Greeks, it presumably
did care about the investments of German banks whose exposure to Greece in the first
quarter of 2010 was, at USD44.2 billion (24 percent of the total exposure of European
banks), second only to France’s USD71.1 billion.66 As Alessandro Leipold, former
acting director of the IMF European department, noted, there were “intrinsically
strong German interests” at stake.67 There is no doubt that the German government
64. “German Voters Poised to Punish Merkel Party Over Greece”.
65. “Merkel’s Party Braces for Electoral Backlash over Greece,” Agence France-Presse, 9 May 2010,
retrieved from <http://www.expatica.com/de/news/Merkels-party-braces-for-electoral-backlash-over-Greece_
176544.html>.
66. Buiter and Rahbari 2010, Figure 4.
67. Jack Ewing, “Already Holding Junk, Germany Hesitates,” The New York Times, 28 May 2010,
retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/business/global/29banks.html>.
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was aware of these highly risky entanglements.68 It is very implausible that it would
not have acted upon this knowledge to prevent an almost certain spillover of the crisis
to Germany just because of its cultural commitment to austerity, especially since this
would have almost inevitably created the inflationary pressures that the government
was determined to prevent.
Second, and crucially, the explanation cannot account for the clobbering the voters
in NRW delivered to Merkel’s party. Suppose that the chancellor had been just as
convinced as the voters of the wisdom of the schwäbische Hausfrau strategy until
the end of April but then underwent a rapid conversion. Why would the voters not
follow her in that? After all, she had been the most hawkish Eurozone leader on
Greece, and if she had suddenly come to the realization that a bailout was necessary
to save the euro, the voters should have believed her. Only Nixon could go to China,
and only Merkel could go to Greece. But the voters did not believe her.
One might be tempted to argue that the German voters punished the CDU because
Merkel was inconsistent—first opposing the bailout, but then flip-flopping—or
because her Machiavellian tactics had worsened the crisis, saddling Germany with
six times the costs. But this was not how the Germans voters interpreted it. They
remained unconvinced about the seriousness of the crisis. Polls in late April and
early May showed that the majority of Germans opposed the bailout because they
believed it was wrong to aid Greece. Surveys also revealed that they did not consider
the crisis a top priority for Germany, and did not expect it to affect them adversely
personally. These data point to a failure to carry the voters on the new policy, not
to a punishment for not dealing with a serious crisis promptly.
A War of Attrition?
A second possible explanation centers on a potential distributional conflict as the
source for the delay. Accordingly, Merkel was holding out for better terms, both
from the Greek government and from the fellow Eurozone members. The Greeks
had to commit to even more drastic austerity measures, while the Eurozone
members had to agree to terms that would not prejudice the credibility of the
threat to let future spendthrifts sort out their own problems. The peculiar insistence
on IMF participation—long opposed by other Eurozone members—must be seen
in that light because that organization had a lot of experience of imposing unpopular
reforms on recipient countries.
The war-of-attrition logic can explain the initial phase of negotiations. As the crisis
worsened in early 2010, Greece was increasingly willing to accept tougher austerity
measures as demanded by the German government. The problem with this explana-
tion is that Germany had already achieved all of its stated goals in principle with the
68. Not only did the German government know, it had already secretly acted upon these risks by pro-
viding bailouts to its entangled banks in 2008 and 2009. Bastasin 2012.
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25 March agreement, and in practice with the 11 April decision to make the rescue
mechanism fully operational.69 The IMF had been involved since the March agree-
ment, and Schäuble himself had indicated in an interview that the outline of the aus-
terity program had been decided in mid March.70 Moreover, Merkel had already
dropped the insistence on market rates for the loans in the 11 April agreement.
Finally, the “shallow text” of the 11 February agreement, with its emphasis on the
defense of the monetary union’s stability, was a “crucial strategic coup for
Merkel” because it allowed her to deflect a potential bailout challenge by the
Constitutional Court.71
While it is true that the Greek government announced a third wave of cuts in con-
junction with the 2 May deal, one cannot argue that Merkel had delayed obtaining its
formal commitment. The chancellor herself claimed to have done so because without
Athens announcing new austerity measures, giving aid “would have had the opposite
effect” to calming markets.72 The irony of this statement in light of the reason the
markets had gone berserk cannot be overstated.
In fact, it was because of this that the press and the opposition had speculated that
Merkel’s tough line had been a domestic kabuki theater at least since March.73 That is
also why Steinmeier accused Merkel of playing a double game between Brussels and
Berlin, “Madame No—that was a huge hoax.”74 He also dismissed the notion that the
delay had been a part of some coherent plan to create a better policy. As he told
Merkel, “You drifted around like a windsock. Then in retrospect you call that your
strategy. Your double game has cost us an enormous amount of trust and respect
in Europe.”75 The allegation of ex post rationalization is also supported by the fact
that the German government only belatedly (after 28 April) started to insist on the
importance of the crisis for Germany itself.
This explanation also has a flaw in the logic of the strategy itself given that it was
being played in an electoral shadow. Merkel could have denied that the Greek crisis
posed a problem for Germany in an attempt to signal that her government had little
69. Carsten Volkery, “The Greek Bailout Plan: Merkel’s Risky Hand of Brussels Poker,” Der Spiegel
Online, 26 March 2010, retrieved from <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-greek-bailout-
plan-merkels-risky-hand-of-brussels-poker-a-685771.html>; Philipp Wittrock, “An Aid Package in the
Billions: Merkel’s Bluff Called in Poker over Greece,” Der Spiegel Online, 12 April 2010, retrieved
from <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/an-aid-package-in-the-billions-merkel-s-bluff-called-in-
pokerover-greece-a-688580.html>.
70. Interview on Deutschlandfunk, 22 April 2010.
71. Bastasin 2012, 70.
72. “Merkel Defends Foot-dragging over Greece,” Agence France-Presse, 5 May 2010, retrieved from
<http://www.expatica.com/de/news/Merkel-defends-foot-dragging-over-Greece_175258.html>.
73. Michael Bröcker, “Landtagswahl in NRW: Heute Geht Es Auch Um Merkels Zukunft” [State
Election in NRW: Today Is Also About Merkel’s Future], Rheinische Post, 8 May 2010, retrieved from
<http://www.rp-online.de/nrw/landespolitik/heute-geht-es-auch-um-merkels-zukunft-aid-1.1142849>.
74. Christian Heiko Spließ, “Steinmeier: Nur Geld Überweisen, Reicht Nicht” [Steinmeier: The
Transmission of Money Is Not Sufficient], XN Press, 3 May 2010, retrieved from <http://www.xtra-
news.de/2010/05/03/steinmeier-nurgeld-ueberweisen-reicht-nicht-id2216079.html>.
75. “Merkel Defends Taking Time Over Greece,” Agence France-Presse, 5 May 2010, retrieved from
<http://www.expatica.com/de/news/Merkel-defends-taking-time-over-Greece_175297.html>.
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incentive to act unless all its stringent conditions had been met. This might have
increased the credibility of the threat, but since she had done so publicly, it also sig-
naled to the German electorate that a bailout was unnecessary. Judging from the
opinion surveys and the prevalent opinion in the press, the voters seem to have
believed her. But if Merkel knew a bailout was coming and was merely stalling
for terms, this would have been a silly thing to do because the bailout would certainly
upset the voters. A more profitable strategy would have been to indicate that a bailout
was necessary and outline the conditions Athens had to satisfy to obtain it. Of course,
Merkel later claimed that this had been precisely what she had done, except that
somehow nobody had understood her that way: not the IMF, not her fellow
European heads of state, not the domestic opposition, not the press, and not the
voters.
Conclusion
We wondered why cooperation on the first Eurozone bailout was so difficult to
achieve despite strong pressures to do so. In particular, we were puzzled by the
fact that the most important holdout was the country that stood to lose most if the
crisis got out of hand. Our answer is that intergovernmental actions take place in
front of domestic audiences who might use the actions they can observe to form opin-
ions about their appropriateness and condition their electoral choices on the infer-
ences they make. Strong domestic opinions can lead to suboptimal foreign policies
although the threat of electoral sanction and the promise of electoral reward can
also induce governments to cooperate only when their citizens want them to.
Our model has broader implications for international relations theory. Consider the
interaction between governments and their citizens. By bringing in the electoral moti-
vation, we immediately raise the familiar principal-agent problem of how citizens can
get governments with divergent preferences to behave.76 The context we study,
however, is novel because we incorporate a crucial feature of international politics:
the presence of other governments who are agents of different principals but
whose actions are observable and therefore potentially informative as well.
Although this setting will be familiar to anyone who studies two-level games, our
emphasis on signaling (as opposed to distributive conflict) is new. Consider the dif-
ference between a mixed and an internationalist dyad. Whereas the presence of the
nationalist government ensures that signaling will be credible and as a result interna-
tional action will not occur in a mild crisis, a combination of internationalist prefer-
ences ensures that signaling will be unreliable: these governments would collude and
as a result the CPE cannot be sustained (Propositon 1). The “democratic deficit” can
occur because the lack of transparency in international negotiations provides govern-
ments with opportunities to collude in pursuit of their preferences to the disadvantage
76. Ferejohn 1986; Austen-Smith and Banks 1989; Przeworski 1999.
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of the voters. In this context, international cooperation can become domestically
abusive.
The electoral control mechanism can be further weakened by the beliefs of the cit-
izens themselves: whenever they hold strong priors about the desirability of some par-
ticular foreign policy, governments might not be able to signal the need for a different
policy even when this need might be real and the citizens would want to know it. As
Propositions 2 and 3 show, such circumstances can produce various international
cooperative behaviors that fail the domestic normative test. Government efforts to
influence citizen beliefs can become self-fulfilling prophecies and, as the German
example demonstrates, turn into serious obstacles to implementing policies the
voters would actually prefer.
The model also yields a different take on how the diversity of preferences among
members of an international organization affects the prospects for cooperation. It is
commonly accepted in the literature that the more heterogenous the membership,
the “shallower” the cooperation.77 When scholars argue to the contrary, they point
to heterogeneity increasing the opportunities for issue linkages and coalition forma-
tion.78 In contrast, we find that heterogeneity can have a positive effect on the pros-
pects for international cooperation because the presence of diverse governments can
enable credible information transmission to the voters. In an environment plagued by
informational asymmetries credible signaling by governments can be crucial in secur-
ing their cooperation on international issues by helping them avoid adverse domestic
reactions to such behavior. When it comes to working agreements, the breadth and
the depth might be mutually reinforcing.
It is uncontroversial that domestic politics matter for foreign policy. Far more
important is how they matter, and here there has been a distinct tendency to use
domestic-political arguments to explain why states choose foreign policies that are
suboptimal from some normative perspective. Our approach explicitly rejects the
notion of a normative standard that is defined without reference to citizens’ prefer-
ences. “International cooperation” must be understood not in terms of whether gov-
ernments abide by their agreements or agree to bear costs when benefits diffuse to
other governments, but also in relation to the domestic preferences these governments
are supposed to represent.
This normative perspective allows us to go beyond treating domestic politics as a
foil for foreign policy or a last-resort explanation of some shortcoming it is supposed
to have, and explore how foreign policy actions—cooperative or not—can inform cit-
izens and perhaps enable them to implement electoral strategies that provide incen-
tives to their government to choose policies in line with their preferences. In this
light, our finding that the CPE can be supported in mixed or internationalist dyads
only when the governments are jointly vulnerable electorally is illustrative as an
77. See, among others, Kahler 1992; König 2007; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Moravcsik
1991; Schneider and Urpelainen 2014. For a dissenting view, see Keleman, Menon, and Slapin 2014.
78. Golub 2007; Martin 1994.
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instance of international cooperation that produces outcomes to the citizens’ liking
that would not be achievable by governments that are unconstrained domestically.
“Domestic politics” need not be dirty words when it comes to foreign policy.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material for this article is available at <https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0020818317000406>.
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